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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARTHUR JACKETT, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
vs. 
LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF 
WATER AND POWER, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
C^ nirt of Appeals 
Case No. 880040-CA 
Category 14(b) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, LOS ANGEtES DEPARTMENT 
OF WATER AND POWER 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction 
of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(h) 
(1987). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
granting defendant's motion to dismiss and thereby dismissing 
plaintiff's complaint, with prejudice. 
The order of dismissal, filed October 14, 1987, 
appears in the record on appeal at page 50. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
In this matter involving a California resident as 
plaintiff verses a California governmental entity as defendant, 
did the district court abuse its discretion when it applied as 
a matter of comity, the appropriate California Governmental 
Claims Act Statute of Limitations? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a personal injury suit wherein Mr. Arthur 
Jackett seeks damages for injuries allegedly suffered when 
the helicopter in which he was riding was forced to make an 
emergency landing. The helicopter was allegedly owned by the 
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, who is the only 
named defendant in this suit. At the time of the accident Mr. 
Jackett was a resident of the State of California and the Los 
Angeles Department of Water and Power was a California 
Governmental Entity. 
In California, as in Utah, before an action can be 
commenced against a governmental entity certain conditions must 
be met. Pursuant to the California Governmental Claims Act 
after the appropriate notice provisions are met the claimant 
has a period of two years from the date of the injury within 
which to file his complaint. Mr. Jackett timely filed his 
notice of claim in California, but failed to commence his suit 
within two years of the date of injury and so, on April 25, 
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1987, Mr. Jackett's claim became time-barred in California. 
Two months later he filed a complaint in Utah. 
In lieu of an answer, defendant, the Los Angeles 
Department of Water and Power (hereinafter "the Department") 
filed a motion to dismiss. The Department argued that as a 
matter of comity, the Utah District Court should recognize and 
apply the California Governmental Claims Act, which time-barred 
Jackett1s action. The district court granted the motion. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMEN^1 
This is a clear and obvious cafee of forum shopping. 
After having timely filed the appropriate notice of claim 
required under the California Governmental Claims Act, in 
apparent preparation to initiate suit in California, Mr. 
Jackett failed to timely file a complaint within the California 
two year statute of limitations. Two motiths after his cause of 
action was time-barred in California, Mr. Jackett filed his 
complaint in Utah. The United States Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that state courts have both the right and the 
power to recognize and apply at their discretion the 
appropriate sovereign immunity laws of sister states as a 
matter of comity and to thereby eliminate such forum shopping. 
That is exactly what the district court did in this case. 
On appeal it is Mr. Jackettfs burden to establish 
that the district court abused its discretion which in Utah 
requires that he establish that the disttict judge acted 
unreasonably, capriciously, and arbitrarily. No such showing 
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has been made and therefore, the district court's order of 
dismissal should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHETHER TO RECOGNIZE, AS A MATTER OF COMITY, 
A SISTER'S STATE'S LAW REGARDING SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
IS A MATTER WITHIN THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
Although a matter of first impression in Utah, the 
issues presented by this case have been dealt with by several 
state and federal courts including the United States Supreme 
Court. In Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979) the Supreme 
Court determined that the states are not constitutionally 
required to recognize or apply a sister's state's sovereign 
immunity law in their own courts. However, the Court then 
recognized that although states are not constitutionally 
required to acknowledge each other's sovereign immunity, they 
are free to do so: 
It may be wise policy, as a matter of 
harmonious interstate relations for States 
to accord each other immunity or to respect 
any established limits on liability. They 
are free to do so. 
Id. at 426 (Emphasis added.) Following Nevada v. Hall, 
various state and federal courts have exercised their 
discretion and have sometimes decided to acknowledge a sister 
state's sovereign immunity law and sometimes not. See, Lee 
v. Miller County, Arkansas, 800 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1986); 
Newberry v. Georgia Department of Industry and Trade, 33 6 
S.E.2d 464 (S.C. 1985); Ramsden v. State of Illinois, 695 
S.W.2d 457 (MO. 1985); Simmons v. State of Montana and State 
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of Oregon, 670 P.2d 1372 (Mont. 1983); Paulus v. State of 
South Dakota, 201 N.W. 867 (N.D. 1924) all holding that a 
private citizen's suit against a sister state was properly 
dismissed by the trial court based on thfe application, as a 
matter of comity, of that sister state's sovereign immunity 
law; but see, Mianecki v. Second Judicial District Court, 
658 P.2d 422 (Nev. 1983); Ehrlich-Bober & Company, Inc., 
v. University of Houston, 404 N.E.2d 726 (N.Y. 1980) each 
affirming the trial court's discretionary decision not to apply 
a sister state's sovereign immunity law as a matter of comity. 
None of the cases cited above, or those cited in 
appellant's brief, and no cases located by respondent hold or 
even suggest that the trial court lacks the power or the right 
to exercise its discretion with regard to the application of a 
sister state's sovereign immunity law. On the contrary, 
beginning with Nevada v. Hall, courts haVe recognized that 
when it comes to principals of comity eabh case should be 
judged on its own facts and the decision left to the sound 
discretion of the trial court. In that regard, the court in 
Mianecki, supra, stated: 
The principal is appropriately invoked 
according to the sound discretion of the 
court acting without obligation. 
658 P.2d at 425. Again, in Lee v. Mille^ r County, Arkansas, 
supra, the United States Court of Appealb for the Fifth 
Circuit recognized that the decision to extend comity rested 
with the trial court: 
At the outset, we note that in Texas the 
decision to extend comity rests in the 
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sound discretion of the trial court. 
Unless the district court abused its 
discretion in refusing to extend immunity 
to Miller County we must therefore allow 
that refusal to stand. We are not free to 
substitute our own judgment for that of the 
district court. 
800 F.2d at 1376. 
Entrusting the decision to extend comity to sister 
states to the sound discretion of the trial court is 
appropriate. There is no other viable alternative. As is 
discussed infra at 9 - 12 the court must consider the 
peculiar facts of each case, the public policies involved, the 
impact on the orderly administration of justice, the state of 
residence of the parties involved and the extent to which forum 
shopping has occurred or might be discouraged if comity is 
extended to a sister state. If such matters are not entrusted 
to the discretion of the trial court each decision will be 
appealable and each appeal will involve the reviewing court in 
a detailed assessment of the facts of each case. Comity, like 
so many matters entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial 
court, is inherently a matter which must remain flexible and 
thereby responsive to the particular needs of each separate 
case. 
This being a matter entrusted to the sound discretion 
of the trial court, this Court should not reverse absent a 
clear showing of abuse of discretion. In American Salt 
Company v. W. S. Hatch Company, 748 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1987) the 
Court succinctly described the standard for review: 
The general rule concerning abuse of 
discretion is that "this [C]ourt will 
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presume that the discretion of the trial 
court was properly exercised unless the 
record clearly shows the contrary." 
(Citations omitted.) 
Id. at 1068. While considering another matter left to the 
sound discretion of the trial court, chahge of venue, the Utah 
Supreme Court in the case of Anderson v. Johnson, 1 Utah.2d 
400, 268 P.2d 427 (1954) explained what constitutes an abuse of 
discretion: "The trial court's ruling on such a matter will 
not be considered to have been an abuse of discretion unless 
the court acted unfairly, or by whim or caprice or practically 
denied justice in the case. Id. at 430. 
Lastly, it is clear that it is appellant's burden to 
establish an abuse of discretion. Id. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION. IN FACT, THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
DECISION WAS PROPER UNDER ANY STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
The Department does not contend that the district 
court, or this court, is obligated by Utah law, by California 
law, or by federal law to acknowledge the limitations 
California has adopted which restrict its general waiver of 
sovereign immunity. Rather, it is the department's position 
that Utah courts should, as a matter of comity to a sister 
state, recognize and defer to California's law regarding its 
own sovereign immunity. In that context, several courts have 
attempted to defined comity. In Ramsderl v. State of 
Illinois, supra, the court noted that: 
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Comity has been defined as being "a matter 
of courtesy, complaisance, respect - not of 
right but of deference and good will." 
(Citations omitted.) In Ehrlich-Bober & 
Company v. University of Houston, 49 
N*Yo2d 574, 427 NeYeS.2d 604, 608, 404 
N.£.2d 726, 730 (1980), the court stated: 
"The doctrine of comity 'is not rule of law 
but one of practice, convenience and 
expediency.' It does not of its own force 
compel a particular course of action. 
Rather, it is an expression of one state's 
entirely voluntarily decision to defer to 
the policy of another. Such a decision may 
be perceived as promoting uniformity of 
decision, as encouraging harmony among 
participates in a system of cooperative 
federalism, or is merely an expression of 
hope for reciprocal advantage in some 
future case in which the interests of the 
forum are more critical. (Citations 
omitted.)" 
695 S.W.2d at 459. Comity is an expression of federalistic 
courtesy. 
The Department does not suggest that comity should be 
extended blindly, without regard to the public policies of the 
State of Utah. Both what is to be gained and what is to be 
lost by extending comity must be considered. 
Other courts considering whether to extend comity 
have focused on whether the public policies of their respective 
states will be contravened if comity is extended. See, Lee 
v. Miller County, Arkansas, 800 F.2d at 1378 (wherein the 
court stated: "In all but one of the cases in which a court 
refused to extend immunity as a matter of comity, it was clear 
that extending immunity would do violence to the public policy 
of the forum state."); see also, Mianecki, supra, 658 
P.2d at 425; Newberry, supra, 336 S.E.2d at 465. In this 
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case extending comity will not contravene the public policies 
of the State of Utah. Utah, like California, recognizes a 
special statute of limitations when governmental entities are 
involved as defendants. Curiously, both Utah's and 
California's Governmental Entity Statute of Limitations are, in 
respects pertinent to this case, identical. Both are two 
years. See California Governmental Claims Act at 
§945.6(a)(1) and (2); Utah Code Ann. §63^30-13 and §63-30-15 
(1987). By extending comity, the district court has 
acknowledged that a California governmental entity has the same 
right as a Utah governmental entity to gpvern when and how it 
chooses to waive its sovereign immunity. A Utah governmental 
entity in a California court would expect no less. 
This is not a case such as Hall v. Nevada, where 
extending comity would have provided greater immunity in 
California courts for the State of Nevada than would be 
extended to the State of California itself. Hall v. Nevada, 
503 P.2d 1363, 1365 - 1366 (Cal. 1972). Nor is this a case 
such as Mianecki, supra, where the Nevada court 
determined that extending comity would provide immunity to a 
Wisconsin governmental entity under circumstances that a Nevada 
governmental entity having allegedly committed the same tort 
would not enjoy immunity. 658 P.2d at 424. Rather this is a 
case similar to Newberry, supra, where the court noted 
that plaintiff was attempting to circumvent the laws of one 
state by initiating an action in another and concluded that 
although extending comity would result in the dismissal of 
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plaintiff's claim, more important public policies militated in 
favor of comity: 
The court of appeals rejected the argument 
that the principals of comity and public 
policy should foreclose this case. We 
disagree. While it is true that this court 
has established a policy of giving redress 
for tortuous wrongs, there are other 
overriding policy considerations which 
compel us to refuse to entertain 
respondent's action. 
First, as suggested earlier, the opinion of 
the court appeals would lead to forum 
shopping. Although suit in tort could not 
be brought in Georgia, a plaintiff could 
circumvent Georgia's immunity by bringing 
suit in this state. 
Second, allowing this type of suit would 
cause tension between the states and 
further degrade sovereign immunity. 
Finally, there are practical problems 
enforcing the judgment in this case. 
Georgia could refuse to recognize the 
judgment within its boarders and pull its 
investments out of South Carolina in order 
to avoid levy in this case. See Nevada 
v. Hall, (Rhenquist, J., descending.) 
336 S.E.2d at 465. Furthermore, there is another important 
factor which distinguishes this case from all of the cases 
where comity was not extended and which further supports 
extending comity. Jackett was and still is a resident and 
citizen of the State of California. The Department did not 
seek to impose California law upon a Utah citizen, but rather 
asked the district court to recognize California's right to 
control its sovereign immunity with regard to its own 
citizens. The court in Paulus, supra, noted at several 
places in its opinion that it was of primary importance that 
the plaintiff was attempting to circumvent his own state's, 
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(South Dakota), laws in a North Dakota court. Paulus 201 
N.W. at 870. Again, in Hall v. University of Nevada, the 
California Supreme Court distinguished tftat case from 
Paulus on the basis that Hall did not involve a citizen 
of another state: 
In holding that as a matter of comity the 
North Dakota courts should not exercise 
jurisdiction over its sister state, the 
Supreme Court of North Dakota relied in 
part on the fact that the plaintiff was a 
citizen of South Dakota, and to this extent 
the case is distinguishable because the 
plaintiffs herein are California citizens. 
503 P.2d at 1365. No Utah governmental Entity would accept or 
expect that after receiving notice of claim, rejecting the 
claim, then closing the matter after the running of the 
appropriate statute of limitations, a California court would 
subsequently allow a Utah citizen to circumvent his own state's 
requirements when that state's requirements are identical to 
California's. Likewise, the Department should be protected as 
a matter of comity from such a result. 
Jackett argues that the court should ignore comity 
in favor of certainty for the litigants and that in all 
instances the four year statute of limitations provision should 
apply in Utah. Certainty is a laudable froal, but it need not 
be accomplished at the expense of harmonious interstate 
relations and need not encourage forum shopping. All matters 
entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court 
necessarily include an element of uncertainty. That 
uncertainty is generally diminished when courts reviewing the 
trial court's discretionary decisions offer guidelines in their 
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opinions. Likewise, in this case, this Court can reduce 
whatever uncertainty might exist by affirming the trial court's 
decision and by holding that future courts should consider 
whether extending comity in a given case will contravene the 
public policies of the State of Utah; whether extending comity 
will discourage or encourage forum shopping; whether extending 
comity will aid a sister state in maintaining control of its 
sovereign immunity; whether extending comity in a given case 
would be what a Utah governmental entity would expect in a 
sister state under like circumstances and whether extending 
comity will promote fundemental fairness and justice. After 
balancing such factors if the district court believes that 
extending comity is inappropriate, it should exercise its 
discretion and decline to do so. In this case, however, the 
district court accurately assessed the situation and determined 
that comity should be extended. In light of all of the factors 
discussed in all of the cases cited herein, the district 
court's decision cannot be said to have been an abuse of 
discretion and, in fact, cannot be said to have been improper 
under any standard of review. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Department respectfully 
requests this court to affirm the district court's order of 
dismissal. 
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